IMC 2012: Sessions

Session 1733: Philosophical Ideals and Ethics

Thursday 12 July 2012, 14.15-15.45

Moderator/Chair:Marie Thérèse Champagne, Department of History, University of West Florida
Paper 1733-a'Contemplata aliis tradere': What Does Philosophy Mean in the Middle Ages?
(Language: English)
Eduardo Mallo Huergo, Departamento de Teología y Filosofía, Universidad Católica San Pablo
Index terms: Philosophy, Religious Life, Teaching the Middle Ages, Theology
Paper 1733-bCognitive Error and the Infallible Will: Synderesis in the 13th-Century Schools
(Language: English)
Robert Davis, Department of Theology, Fordham University
Index terms: Canon Law, Philosophy, Theology

Paper -a:
It is always a difficult to set the beginning of medieval philosophie. And also the end. As in history itself the changes in philasophie weren’t fast and for no reason. A question one could do is: What has to do Ireneo de Lyon with St Thomas of Aquino. Between them exist eleven centuries and even though they belong, for a majority of authors, to a common age. It is my belief that the bonds between this distances are the philosophical ones. And ultimately are spirituals, more specifically Christians. The whole intellectual activity refers and depends on the soul, the spiritual part of the man. This conexion was essencial for the medieval thinkers, and that is why so many, for not say almost all of philosophers, was monks, priests, bishops, or was connected to the Church in some way. I want to show the hypothesis is that in this sense we can asseverate that medieval philosophy is Christian philosophy, because the medieval man was christian and medieval philosophy was soak by this faith turning this age into a great one and we still imbibing from it.

Paper -b:
Though obscure and relatively short-lived, the notion of synderesis – an infallible inclination of the soul to the good – was crucial to the development of the theory of natural law and conscience in 12th- and 13th-century Christian moral theology. This paper examines this development, focusing specifically on Bonaventure’s understanding of synderesis as an unerring affective ‘weight’, and not a source of rational, universal rules of action. Yet accounting for the operation of an infallible guide within a fallible soul proved difficult, and reveals tensions in scholastic accounts of the relation of reason and will, natural law and sin.